Keywords
innovation signal, trade credit, buyer risk, signal game, supply chain
Abstract
The paper focuses on the central issue of how innovation signal transmission affects supply chain trade credit decisions under buyer risk, then establishes a game model based on innovation signal transmission. The effects of the pledge guarantee funds, camouflage level and trade credit interest rate on the trade credit decision is analyzed. The results show as follows. Under the separation equilibrium, when the buyer sends a high innovation signal, the supplier's best strategy is trade credit. When the buyer sends low innovation signal, trade credit is the best strategy only when the pledge guarantee fund exceeds the critical value; In order to keep the buyer away from the equilibrium, the supplier needs to adjust the credit interest rate of the two buyer enterprises. Under confusion equilibrium, when pledge guarantee fund is small and the proportion of buyer's market with strong innovation ability is greater than the critical value, supplier will conduct trade credit with it; In the case of no trade credit, the buyer with weak innovation ability will deviate from the equilibrium path, for which the supplier should reasonably charge the credit interest rate. This study can not only enrich the research of buyer risk and innovation signal transmission,but also provide reference for decision-making of supply chain trade credit.
DOI
10.16315/j.stm.2023.01.007
Recommended Citation
ZHU, Xue-chun and YANG, Si-lin
(2023)
"Research on supply chain trade credit decision considering innovation signal transmission under buyer risk,"
Journal of Science and Technology Management: Vol. 25:
Iss.
1, Article 8.
DOI: 10.16315/j.stm.2023.01.007
Available at:
https://jstm.researchcommons.org/journal/vol25/iss1/8
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
