•  
  •  
 

Keywords

civilian enterprises’ participation in military, technological innovation, segmented compensation mechanism, dual information asymmetry

Abstract

The civilian enterprises’ participation in military is the process that guiding the advanced civilian enterprises to participate in R&D projects of military technology and equipment orderly, through comprehensive use of demand-pull, policy guidance, planned regulation, legal guarantee and other combined tools by department in charge of defense industry and defense-related research. Although advantages are obvious, there are objective risks of technological innovation in the process of ‘combine military efforts with civilian support’. Concurrently, there are various explicit or implicit obstacles and fault zones in the innovation chain from R&D and pilot test under combat condition, forming the ‘Valley of Death’ and ‘Darwin Sea’ in the process of research and application of innovation achievements, which makes a large number of innovative achievements to be shelved, and finally cannot be applied to the field of the weapons and equipment production system. However, it is difficult to avoid the dilemma of market failure in case of only relying on the own risk prevention ability of civilian enterprises. Therefore, for department in charge of defense industry, it is necessary to comprehensively use public mechanisms and policies to achieve risk sharing and innovation incentives in the activities of civilian enterprises’ participation in military. In view of the problems existing in the research, this paper, from the perspective of information efficiency and incentive compatibility, taking the technological innovation ability of civilian enterprises and their efforts as private information, forms dual information asymmetry, and accordingly constructs a government compensation sharing mechanism for the technological innovation of civilian enterprises, in order to obtain the optimization suggestions for the government to support civilian enterprises to participate in military without the worries behind, and widen the horizon of military-civilian collaborative innovation. To integrate civilian with military purposes and combine military efforts with civilian support, it is considered to support such compensable civilian enterprises by the government. The candidate enterprises applying for compensation can be determined as formal compensation objects only after a series process of certification, qualification and evaluation. In order to strengthen the incentive effect of compensation on the efforts of civilian enterprises’ participation in military, combined with the implementation method, the compensation is designed into a two-stage linear segmented mechanism. Specifically, the compensation process should be divided into two stages, that are the first stage after the candidate is selected, and the second stage based on subsequent innovation performance of the selected one in the first stage. Moreover, it is believed that innovation performance can be used to reflect the degree of civilian effort to a certain extent, and differentiated incentives can be formed through the combination of different compensation methods in the two stages. Finally, based on dual information asymmetry, the two-stage compensation sharing mechanism for technological innovation of civilian enterprises’ participation in military has been discussed. On the basis of the traditional ‘principal-agent’, the incentive compatibility condition is introduced as well as the hybrid incentive compensation model is established, to solve optimal solution of the compensation parameters under the dynamic contract condition and the validity is verified by numerical simulation. The results show that the two-stage compensation sharing mechanism has the functions of ‘self-selection’ and ‘incentive for the strong’. Meanwhile, it promotes the civil enterprises to obtain more innovation benefit compensation through the second stage. In addition, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government compensation effectiveness and the innovation ability of compensation objects. Therefore, the ‘compensable threshold’ and ‘ optimal compensation threshold’ should be set respectively to assess the applicability and priority of compensation.

DOI

10.16315/j.stm.2023.04.002

Download

Share

COinS