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Keywords

service-oriented manufacturing; operational asset management service; principal-agent; dynamic incen-tive; asymmetric information

Abstract

In the innovation and practice process of service-oriented manufacturing models, leading enterprises often encounter the challenge of insufficient back-end capacity support due to the rapid growth of front-end value-added service businesses. To address this issue, a new service-oriented manufacturing model-operational asset management service-has emerged, offering a viable solution that allows small and medium-sized enterprises ( SMEs) to mitigate overcapacity while enabling leading enterprises to bridge their production capacity gaps resulting from service expansion. By adopting this model, SMEs can optimize resource utilization, reduce operational risks, and gain access to advanced technological capabilities, while leading enterprises can extend their service coverage without significant investments in fixed assets, thereby enhancing overall industry efficiency. This study constructs a dynamic principal-agent model to examine the optimal benefit distribution contract between a leading enterprise and an SME within the operational asset management service framework. Through a rigorous theoretical analysis, the study investigates how dynamic incentives influence the effort levels of leading enterprises and how asymmetric information affects contractual efficiency. The findings indicate that the leading enterprise will strategically adjust its level of effort according to the optimal profit distribution ratio, ensuring incentive alignment between both parties. Moreover, under the influence of the ratchet effect, the optimal effort level of the leading enterprise increases over time, reflecting a dynamic trade-off between short-term profit-sharing and long-term strategic benefits. Furthermore, the study highlights the critical role of compatibility between the product service technological capabilities of the leading enterprise and the quality of the operational assets managed on behalf of SMEs. A misalignment in these factors may lead to inefficiencies, reduced profitability, and potential frictions in asset utilization. Therefore, the design of an optimal contract that balances risk allocation, incentive mechanisms, and profit-sharing is crucial for fostering sustainable cooperation between leading enterprises and SMEs. Additionally, the study underscores the impact of asymmetric information in shaping contractual structures and operational strategies, emphasizing the need for mechanisms that mitigate information asymmetries and improve decision-making efficiency. These insights contribute to the broader understanding of service-oriented manufacturing and operational asset management service as effective industrial collaboration models. The theoretical implications of this study provide valuable guidance for policymakers and industry practitioners seeking to establish regulatory frameworks and incentive structures that promote fair and efficient partnerships among leading enterprises and SMEs. Future research can extend these findings by incorporating empirical validation through case studies, exploring the effects of external factors such as market volatility, technological advancement, and policy interventions on the scalability and stability of operational asset management service. By deepening the theoretical foundation of dynamic incentive mechanisms in service-oriented manufacturing, this study advances knowledge on how industrial ecosystems can achieve more efficient resource allocation and long-term sustainable development.

DOI

10. 16315/j. stm. 2025. 01. 001

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